

TRANSPORT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM
CAMBODIA TO COMMUNIST CHINA

On the assumption that military equipment ^{has} ~~have~~ been landed at the port of Sihanoukville, there are several routes available for further transit of the equipment into South Vietnam.

The major route would be the Sihanoukville-Phnom Penh American Friendship highway. This highway is 266 kms long. It has a dry season capacity of 8,000 tons daily and a wet season capacity of 7,350 tons.

From ~~Phnom~~^{Phn}-Penh to the South Vietnam (Tai ^NVinh Province) the major road is route 35 with a dry season capacity of 3,400 tons daily and 1,450 tons daily in the wet season.

There is a shorter, more direct coastal route from Sihanoukville which goes 100 miles to the border of Chau Doc province. This route also has a connection with Kien Giang province. This route has a capacity of 1,000 tons per day into Chau Doc and Kien Giang provinces. In the wet season this capacity is reduced to 150-200 tons daily.

At the border, traffic on both of these highways would probably be subject to inspection by South Vietnamese border forces. Therefore, further transit of military equipment would have to be made by other than truck transport. At each of these crossing areas there is an extensive network of trails and inland waterways. Traffic in these trails and waterways is much more likely to avoid detection by South Vietnamese border forces.

A third alternative route would be to ship military equipment from ~~Phnom~~^{nom} Penh north along the inland waterways to ~~Stung~~^{Stung} Treng. From ~~Stung~~^{Stung} Treng to the border regions along Kontum and Pleiku provinces in South Vietnam is a distance of 110 miles. The roads here are very poor, do not cross the border and deteriorate into a patchwork of crude trails over mountainous areas. For these reasons and because supplies could more easily be infiltrated from Laos, use of this third alternative is unlikely.